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RIGHT TO COUNSEL - THE RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Introduction
Since the Supreme Court's recent disposition of In re Groban,' interest has been
awakened in the question of the right to be represented by counsel in proceedings before
the various administrative agencies, both on the state and federal level. Only recently
have articles %appeared giving some extensive treatment to the question.2 The text
writers have summarily dismissed the problem and very few controversies posing the
exact concern of the Court in In re Groban have found their way to the courts. One
recent statement reasons that since there is a right to counsel in criminal cases, a
similar right should exist in the administrative proceeding. 3 The only other attempt to
meet the problem, also of recent origin, merely reflects the approach of the courts in
the isolated instances when the issue has been adjudicated by making the resolution
dependent upon the type of proceeding and the minimal requirements necessary to
satisfy due process.4 The purpose of this Note is to analyze this relatively new area of the
law and to demonstrate that there is an adequate standard which the courts can follow
that will afford maximum protection to the parties, and yet free the agency of procedural
mires which destroy the necessary efficiency of the administrative process. The primary
purpose of the administrative agency is efficiency, but this necessary goal should not take
arbitrary preference over the rights of parties the agency is designed to serve.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
In re Groban held an Ohio statute 5 providing that the fire marshall should hold
private investigations and exclude from such ". .. all persons other than those required
to be present" valid, and agreed that by such provisions the fire marshall could exclude
counsel which the witness demanded. In accordance with another section of the Ohio
Code, the fire marshall had the witness jailed when he refused to testify under the
imposed conditions. 6
In the dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Black stated that the majority of the Court
had failed to consider ". . . this nation's historic distrust of secret proceedings."'7 How-
ever, a review of the cases in the federal courts prior to the passage of the Administrative
Procedure Acts reveals that the courts were willing to deny counsel to parties and give
approval to such proceedings when labled as investigations,9 or by concluding that the
peculiar nature of the proceeding did not require counsel.' 0 The state courts have also
accepted these distinctions." One jurisdiction, while expressly disapproving the result,
has failed to overrule the earlier holding.
12
1 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
2 Note, 32 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 67 (1957); Note, 58 COLUM. L. Rav. 395 (1957).
3 32 ST. JOHN'S L. REv., supra note 2 at 67.
4 58 COLUM. L. REv., supra note 2.
5 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3737.13 (Page 1956).
6 In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957). This was a 5-4 decision. The majority assumed that the
proceeding was entirely investigatory, and that the presence of counsel might disrupt the proceedings.
7 Id. at 338 (dissenting opinion). The dissent was written by the Chief Justice with Justices
Douglas and Black joining in the opinion.
8 60 Stat. 237 (1946); 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952). It would seem that this act does not cover in-
vestigations or all proceedings before administrative agencies. Niznik v. United States, 173 F.2d 328
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 925 (1949) (selective service); Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42
(5th Cir. 1949), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 340 U.S. 880 (1950) (parole); United States v.
Smith, 87 F. Supp. 293 (D. Conn. 1949) (dictum) (tax investigation).
9 Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944).
10 United States v. Pitt, 144 F.2d 169 (3rd Cir. 1944) (dictum).
11 Avery v. Studley, 74 Conn. 272, 50 Ad. 752 (1901).
12 Steen v. Board of Civil Serv. Comm'rs, 26 Cal. 2d 716, 160 P.2d 816 (1945). This was a 4-3
decision. The dissenting justices cited Krohn v. Board of Water & Power Comm'rs, 95 Cal. App. 289.
272 Pac. 757 (1928), which held that if a statute provided for an investigation, such did not mean a
hearing. The dissent contended that this was a valid distinction and should control.
NOTES
I. WHEN IS ONE ENTITLED TO COUNSEL?
In the absence of express constitutional or statutory provision there is no
absolute right to counsel. It has been held that the right to be heard is not necessarily
the same as the right to have assistance of counsel, because the right to counsel
"... is not one of the natural rights of man; but . . . is altogether a creature of the
positive law.' 3 As to when one is entitled to assistance of counsel, courts have estab-
lished some rather broad and general criteria. If the proceeding is judicial in nature, 14
or a common-law hearing, 15 one is entitled to counsel, for this is one requirement of due
process. 16 However, not every proceeding called a "hearing" demands counsel' 7 for,
although it may be labled "hearing," it does not have the essential characteristics of the
common-law hearing and may be essentially investigatory in nature. 18 Due process does
not require that every hearing be judicial in character, 19 but rather, allows it to be limited
in scope 20 according to the particular needs of the agency. The text writers21 and the
courts have chosen to label certain proceedings as "judicial" and "hearings" (meaning
the common-law concept) as distinct from proceedings that are "legislative" or "in-
vestigatory." 22
The latter grouping usually does not require the presence of counsel, while the
former does.23 Thus, in every instance of a hearing, denial of counsel will not invalidate
the proceeding.24 To date, however, no real standards have been established which the
courts can or do follow. No rigid and fixed standard can be established, but the courts
should develop some workable guide to afford the individual protection of his rights.
For the purpose of example, three areas of the law will be reviewed where admin-
istrative agencies play an important role. These areas are the revocation of licenses,
revocation of parole and suspended sentences, and the removal from office of public
officers and civil servants. By recognizing the representation problems raised in these
areas and analyzing the methods used by the courts in solving them, a minimal standard
should emerge.
A. The License Cases
The courts still adhere to the distinction of whether a license gives the holder
some interest or right, or just a mere privilege. Usually the terms "vested interest" and
"property right" are used synonymously.2 5 If the court can find a right involved, they
will normally require a hearing before permitting revocation of the license. Otherwise
the license can be revoked by order without notice. However, the New York courts have
retreated from this position, and are willing to construe almost any license as giving rise
to some type of vested interest.2 6
13 State ex reL Charles v. Board of Comm'rs, 159 La. 69, 105 So. 228, 229 (1925).
14 People ex rel. Mayor v. Nichols, 79 N.Y. 582 (1879); People ex rel. Smith v. Phisterer, 73
N.Y. Supp. 124 (App. Div. 1901).
15 A common-law hearing requires (1) the right to know the charges, (2) right to meet such
charges with competent evidence, and (3) the right to be heard by counsel. "Hearing" includes "oral
arguments." State ex rel. Arnold v. Milwaukee, 157 Wis. 505, 147 N.W. 50 (1914).
16 Almon v. Morgan County, 245 Ala. 241, 16 So. 2d 511 (1944); Ekem v. McGovern, 154Wis.
157, 142 N.W. 595 (1913).
17 United States ex rel. Castro-Louzan v. Zimmerman,'94 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (dictum).
IS Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
19 L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 170 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
20 Avery v. Studley, supra note 11.
21 FORKOSCH. ADMIsmnvaT LAW § 191 (1956).
22 See Note, 58 COLUM. L. Rnv. 396-97 (1957).
23 Almon v. Morgan County, supra note 16.
24 The Golden Sun, 30 F. Supp. 354 (S.D. Cal. 1939); Avery v. Studley, 74 Conn. 272, 50 At.
752 (1901).
25 The various courts have used the terms interchangeably, although "property right" is sometimes
used to denote purely economic interest.
26 Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N.Y. 435, 103 N.E.2d 728 (1952) (driver's license).
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The traditional, and still the majority view, holds that a state can, with some
exceptions, grant and revoke a license at will as a valid exercise of its police powers.2 7
One of the reasons advanced to support this view is that because a license lacks the
essential elements of a vested interest or property right, it does not demand constitutional
protection, and a person must take the license subject to any and all conditions that the
state or authorizing agency may impose. Therefore, it is not necessary for the legislature
to provide for either notice or hearing before revocation, and a person accepting the
license cannot complain when termination occurs in accordance with its own condi-
tions.28 Thus, licenses have been revoked without notice or hearing for such activities as
the sale and distribution of milk,29 operation of a drive-in theater,30 sale of alcholic
beverages, operation of taverns, 31 and the operation of a motor vehicle.32
The New York courts, although following the property theory, have reached a
different result by reasoning that if a license gives the holder a valuable convenience,
then the individual is entitled to a hearing before the license can be revoked. Under
this theory a driver's license has been given full protection.3 3 The acceptance of the
valuable convenience conferred by the license as an interest akin to property, or at
least as worthy of protection, has enabled the New York courts to afford the licensee a
reasonable degree of protection without total abandonment of the traditional property
or vested interest formula.
Many of the statutes that authorize the issuance of a license by an administrative
agency usually provide for some type of hearing before the license can be revoked.34 The
statutes which do not specifically provide what type of hearing should be granted are
usually construed to mean that the hearing must be "judicial" in nature.3 5 One court
struck down as a violation of due process a licensing statute that provided for a judicial
hearing, but failed to provide any means for the agency to compel witnesses to appear
or testify, or any other specific procedure whereby the rights of the licensee could be
protected.3 6 It appears that once the statute has undertaken to provide some elements
of procedural due process, there must be a complete presentation of the requirements to
save the statute and substantial compliance with its provisions to sustain the hearing.
B. Revocation of Parole and Suspended Sentences
A large number of states have held that a parole or suspended sentence can be
revoked without notice or hearing.3 7 This is the rule on the federal level as Congress
may grant parole and suspended sentences as they see fit and summary revocation does
27 Leakey v. Real Estate Comm'n, 80 Ga. App. 272, 55 S.E.2d 818 (1949); Northern Cedar Co.
v. French, 131 Wash. 394, 230 Pac. 837 (1924). The licenses that are generally protected are those
which authorize engagement in some trade, association, or profession. Where the statute authorizes
revocation for cause, the implication is that the license is entitled to a hearing. Carroll v. Horse
Racing Bd., 16 Cal. 2d 164, 105 P.2d 110 (1940); State ex reL Orleans Athletic Club v. State Boxing
Comm'n, 163 La. 418, 112 So. 31 (1927).
28 Marrone v. City Manager, 329 Mass. 378, 108 N.E.2d 553 (1952).
29 Leach v. Coleman, 188 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); State ex rel. Nowotny v. Milwaukee,
140 Wis. 38, 121 N.W. 658 (1909).
A0 Marrone v. City Manager, supra note 28.
31 Walker v. City of Clinton, 245 Iowa 74, 59 N.W.2d 785 (1953).
32 Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W.2d 177 (1953); Doyle v. Kahl,
242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52 (1951); Goodwin v. Superior Court, 68 Ariz. 108, 201 P.2d 124 (1949.
33 Wignall v. Fletcher, supra note 26.
34 CAL. Gov'r CODa §§ 11505, 11509; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 310.27 (1955).
35 See cases cited in note 27 supra.
36 Jewell v. McCann, 95 Ohio St. 191, 116 N.E. 42 (1917).
37 In re Charizo, 138 A.2d 430 (Vt. 1958); Ex parte Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793 (1952);
Washburn v. Utecht, 236 Minn. 31, 51 N.W.2d 657 (1952); Ex parte Anderson, 191 Ore. 409, 229
P.2d 633 (1951); Ex parte Dearo, 96 Cal. App. 2d 141, 214 P.2d 585 (1950); Carpenter v. Berry, 95
N.H. 151, 59 A.2d 485 (1948); In re Weber, 75 Ohio App. 206, 61 N.E.2d 502 (1945); Mincey v.
Crow, 198 Ga. 245, 31 S.E.2d 406 (1944); Ex parte Boyd, 73 Okla. Crim. 441, 122 P.2d 162 (1942);
Varela v. Merrill, 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d 569, (1937); Pagano v. Bechly, 211 Iowa 1294, 232 N.W. 798
(1930); Brozosky v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 222 N.W. 311 (1928); People v. Dudley, 173 Mich. 389, 138
N.W. 1044 (1912); People ex rel. Joyce v. Strassheim, 242 Ii. 359, 90 N.E. 118 (1909) (dictum).
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not violate the due process requirements. 38 One of the leading cases is Varela v.
Merrill3 9 wherein the court considered the contentions of the parties at length. The
petitioner claimed that he was entitled to be brought into court and granted a hearing
at which sufficient evidence would have to be produced to justify the revocation of his
parole. The state contended that a parole was solely a matter of grace, not of right, and
as such, it could impose any conditions upon parole it deemed advisable. Consequently,
no formal hearing or reception of evidence was necessary to validate the revocation
order. The Arizona Supreme Court refused the petitioner's application for a writ of
habeas corpus, emphasizing that the statute authorizing the revocation 40 was constitu-
tional, since the parolee, after conviction, could have been sentenced for the maximum
statutory period. The court concluded that it was only through the benificence of the
law that the parole was granted.
A recent Vermont case4 ' reiterated this principle holding that when the governor
revokes a parole, it will be assumed that he acted regularly and that it is not necessary
for him to specify the grounds of his action. Ex parte Dearo,42 a case frequently cited
by courts adopting the rule of summary revocation, contains a wealth of authority to
support its claim that this is the majority position. However, as illustrated by the dissent
in Ex parte Dearo,43 this position has received far less than unanimous judicial
approval. A number of courts have held that one has a constitutional right to notice
and hearing before a suspended sentence or parole can be revoked.4 4 "The suspension of
the execution of the sentence gives to the defendant a valuable right. It gives to him
the right of personal liberty, which is one of the highest rights of citizenship. ' 4 5 A
parole may attach any reasonable condition, but the reservation of the right of re-
vocation does not carry with it the authority to exercise it arbitrarily. The parolee must
be afforded an opportunity to be heard, 46 although this does not mean a formal trial.
4 7
Where a statute has given the power of revocation to an administrative agency, the
courts have held that the agency must conduct a hearing, afford adequate notice of the
charges, receive evidence from both sides, and permit the parolee to be heard by
counsel.48 A Maryland court was very specific in holding that no matter how informal
'the hearing, the defendant has a right to have counsel present, because this is a
necessary ingredient of a fair hearing.49 Where counsel was first withheld and later
permitted to appear as a "friend" of the defendant, and the defendant was not allowed
to call any easily obtainable witnesses, the proceeding was declared invalid.50 "Informal
as such a hearing may have been intended, the prisoner should, if he desires, be per-
mitted to have his own counsel present." 51
38 Hiatt v. Compagna, supra note 8.
39 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d 569 (1937).
40 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1657 (1956).
41 In re Charizo, 138 A.2d 430 (Vt. 1958).
42 96 Cal. App. 2d 241, 214 P.2d 585 (1950).
43 Id. at 589. The main contention is that the holding of the majority violates the due process
clause of both the state and federal constitutions.
44 Mason v. Cochran, 209 Miss. 163, 46 So. 2d 106 (1950); Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va.
357, 39 S.E.2d 479 (1946); State ex rel. Murray v. Swenson, 196 Md. 222, 76 A.2d 150 (1940); State
y. Q'Neal, .147 Wash. 179, 265 Pac. 175 (1928); State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 Pac. 1044
(1927); Ex parte Lucero, 23 N.M. 433, 168 Pac. 713 (1917).
45 Ex parte Lucero, supra note 44 at 715.
46 State ex rel. Murray v. Swenson, supra note 44.
47 Slayton v. Commonwealth, supra note 44. The probationer was not entitled to a judicial hearing
but the court indicated that a summary hearing would be sufficient to meet the requirements of due
process of law.
48 Jackson v. Mayo, 73 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1954).
49 Warden v. Palumbo, 214 Md. 407, 135 A.2d 439 (1957). By dicta the court indicated that one
would have no right to counsel in a proceeding for application for parole. But see MinN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 611.12(3), 611.13(3)(1947) which provide that if the committing judge deems it advisable, he may,
by order, direct the public defender to appear before the parole board upon behalf of any applicant.
G0 State v. Boggs, 49 Del. 277, 114 A.2d 663 (1955)-. Cf. Lockman v. Rhodes, 129 A.2d 549 (Del.
1957).
51 Id. at 665.
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Many state statutes provide that revocation proceedings are to be held in open
court. 52 These have been interpreted in most instances to mean that a person must be
afforded the right to a hearing with the benefit of counsel.53 One state has extended
this right to mean that the person is entitled to a trial by jury,54 but while this case
has never been expressly overruled, its thrust has been tempered by a more recent
decision holding that a jury trial is not a requisite to this type of open hearing.55
C. Removal of Public Officials and Civil Servants
Of all the areas of administrative law where the question of right to counsel has
arisen, courts have experienced the least difficulty in resolving the question when it
involves the removal of a public official or civil servant. 56 The statute that creates the
public office may also provide for judicial type hearings before removal, and from
such provisions it may be inferred that the affected public employee may be represented
by counsel if he chooses.57 Where the statute makes no specific demands, many states
have chosen to label the proceedings as judicial if the statutes provide that removal can
only be for cause.58 However, some states have held that statutory silence does not
give rise to such an inference, as there exists a presumption that the agency acted law-
fully and reasonably, and that the aggrieved party has the right to judicial review. 59
D. Exercise of Some Plenary Powers of the Government
Recently, the exercise of some of the plenary powers6 0 of the government, particul-
arly on the federal level, has undergone careful study and examination by many eminent
authorities. Of great concern has been the Federal Government's policy in deportation
proceedings, the rights of persons appearing before investigating committees of
legislative bodies, and the powers of the special commissions created by the legislatures
to study and report on some specific problem. 6 ' Among the issues raised regarding
these governmental activities has been the individual's right to counsel when testifying
before such agencies. Some legislative bodies have recognized the desirability of a
person having counsel when appearing before them. 6 2 However, this Note will not
attempt to embrace this particular problem. 63 The problem is of a different nature, as
the person testifying is not an affected party (with the exception of deportation pro-
ceedings) and any harm caused by the lack of counsel is of an indirect nature.
52 ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, §§ 784-89 (Smith-Hurd 1934); Ky. REV. STAT. § 439.060 (1955); N.Y.
CODE CRIM. PROC. § 935; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2901-2908 (1956); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2705
(1953); N.D. REv. CODE § 12-5311 (1943); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2219 (1943); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
15-200, 15-200.1 (1953).
53 People v Enright, 332 111. App. 655, 75 N.E.2d 777 (1947); Bluensky v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky.
395, 144 S.W.2d 1038 (1940); People v. Hill, 164 Misc. 370, 300 N.Y. Supp. 532 (1937); Howe v. State,
170 Tenn. 571, 98 S.W.2d 93 (1936); Plunkett v. Miller, 161 Ga. 466, 131 S.E. 170 (1925); State
ex rel. Vadnais v. Stair, 48 N.D. 472, 185 N.W. 301 (1921); Sellers v. State, 105 Neb. 748, 181 N.W.
862 (1921); State v. Burnette, 173 N.C. 734, 91 S.E. 364 (1917). However, not every "hearing" statute
means one has a right to counsel. Hiatt v. Campagna, supra note 8.
54 State v. Renew, 136 S.C. 302, 132 S.E. 613 (1926).
55 State v. White, 218 S.C. 130, 61 S.E.2d 754 (1950). This holding is based upon the interpretation
of a statute; S.C. CODE § 1038-3 (1942). A real inconsistency arises as Renew was grounded upon
constitutional bases. No mention of Renew appears in White.
56 See cases cited in note 12 supra.
57 Cf. Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N.W. 595 (1913).
58 People ex. rel. Mayor v. Nichols, supra note 14. See also note 27 supra.
59 Cf. Price v. Seattle, 89 Wash. 376, 81 Pac. 847 (1905).
60 Plenary powers are job dismissals, immigration policy, congressional investigations, and other
similar governmental functions.
61 Recently there has probably been more written in this area in the "popular" field than legal,
although it is still regarded as an important legal problem. See Note, Constitutional Limitations Upon
Congressional Investigations, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 645 (1958).
62 H.R. Doc. No. 57, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 366 (Supp.), Rule 11 § 25(K) (1955).
63 For a recent treatment of this problem see 7 BUFFALO L. REv. 267 (1958) and 62 DicK L. REv.
273 (1958).
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDARD
A close examination of the cases involving the role of the administrative agency
in the three areas mentioned above will give some insight into the thinking of the
courts. It is evident that although the courts have resolved the issue by a labeling
process, they were first required to make a determination of what the agency had
done-that is, decide whether or not the agency determination affected some sub-
stantial right of the party.64 It is submitted that this determination of substantial right
should be one of the controlling tests and carry over into the so-called "investigatory"
proceedings. 65 Investigations of an administrative agency have been looked upon by
the courts as merely preparatory to the enforcement of legislation, and therefore similar
to a grand jury proceeding.66 Information obtained is not conclusive against anyone, as
there are no interested parties, and no determination or decision of a final nature can
be made.67 On the other hand, a hearing is a formal proceeding which proceeds to a
final determination or judgment. 68 The courts have concluded that since administrative
investigations are similar to grand jury inquiries, and since no one is entitled to counsel
before a grand jury, no one has a right to counsel in an administrative investigation. 69
However, there is in fact little similarity between an administrative agency investigation
and a grand jury inquiry. Both are empowered to subpoena witnesses to testify, and
to compel the production of records and documents upon demand. But here the
similarity ends. The grand jury is an institution of great historical significance in the
growth of Anglo-American law. It is a selected panel of private citizens, summoned for
a short period of time and, in some instances, for one particular purpose. The grand
jury merely indicts, that is, it only determines whether or not there exists sufficient
cause for the prosecuting authorities to act. It does not take part in the later prosecution
and the subsequent determination of guilt or innocence.70 But the same agency that
investigates later prosecutes and takes part in the final determination. 71 In most instances
the proceedings of the grand jury are secret. 72 The courts have similarly excluded coun-
sel from investigations upon the grounds that necessity demands secret proceedings,
7 3
but it is rather strange to exclude an officer of the court for that reason. It may be
necessary to exclude the general public and even court reporters, but an attorney stands
in a different position.
Whether the primary purpose of an investigation by an administrative body is to
sift the evidence and charges and thereby determine what are to be the issues at the
later stages of the proceedings, or solely to acquire information, counsel should be
present at this stage in order to protect the rights of the individuals involved. As Mr.
Justice Jackson, concurring in part and dissenting in part, said in Watts v. Indiana,
74
64 Substantial right is a term employed by the writer to mean any privilege, right, or activity that
the party exercised or engaged in before the agency acted. The terms can be applied to activities as
diverse as practicing law and driving an automobile. This contention, to expand further, is that just
as a state is not required in every instance to grant a defendant a jury trial, still, if it does, that trial
must be maintained with certain standards. Similarly, a state, after granting any right, privilege, or
activity, must maintain some type of hearing with opportunity of counsel before the state can abridge
or revoke that which it gave.
65 See dissenting opinion in In re Groban, supra note 7.
66 Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944); Wolley v. United States, 97 F.2d 258 (9th Cir.
1938); SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
67 In re SEC, 14 F. Supp. 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
68 DAvis, ADMInisTRATvE LAW § 131 (1951).
60 Bowles v. Baer, supra note 66.
70 ALExA NDR, LAw oF ARREsT § 32(c) (1949).
71 DAvis, op cit. supra note 68, § 131.
72 ALEXANDER, op cit. supra note 70, § 32(c).
73 Bowles v. Baer, supra note 66.
74 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949). The issue in this case was the validity of a confession. But this issue is
present in administrative investigations, i.e., forcing the party to produce evidence against his interest
without affording him any protection. However,. United States v. Levine, 127 F. Supp. 621 (D. Mass.
1955) contends this works no injury upon the person since any evidence illegally seized adduced at
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"to subject one without counsel to questioning which may and is intended to convict
him is a real peril to individual freedom" and "[to] interrogate without counsel . ..
largely negates the benefits . . . of right of assistance of counsel,"'7 5 at the later stages.
Two arguments are frequently advanced as to why counsel should or need be
excluded from the investigations. One is that the presence of counsel would unnecessarily
burden the proceedings, causing delay and confusion. Secondly, it is contended that a
witness or party before the investigating body can fully protect himself by asserting
the privilege against self-incrimination. To accept either argument is utterly to ignore
reality. One of the principal duties of counsel, other than protecting the rights of his
client, is to assure that the proceedings are orderly and efficient. As the dissent in
Groban suggests:
Perhaps, if a real need could be shown, counsel could be restricted to advising his
client and prohibited from making statements or asking questions. And there are
other alternatives, much less drastic or prejudical to the witness than complete
exclusion of his counsel, which might provide satisfactory protection for the wit-
ness without unduly impairing the efficiency of the examination. 76
The argument that a person can always assert his constitutional privileges is also without
merit. When the court itself is not sure of the bounds and limitations of one's
constitutional privileges, how can it assert that a private citizen, who has had little or
no contact with the "niceties of the law" will be able to protect himself? When the
statute that compels him to testify also provides for various contempt charges, how can
an uncounseled layman, after being informed of such provisions, determine when he is
entitled to assert the privilege against self-incrimination? Other pit-falls await the
unsuspecting layman, such as the possibility of waiver. True, the attorney cannot always
correctly answer these questions, but by his experience and knowledge he is able to
protect more fully the individual's rights.
Presence of counsel does not include the necessity of a formal hearing. Counsel
might be present only to advise the witness of constitutional rights. 77 To hold that his
presence in such a limited capacity would unduly hamper the operation of an investi-
gation is groundless, unless the investigating agency proposes to operate as a Star
Chamber. The test for assistance of counsel should not be whether the proceeding is a
"hearing" or "investigation," but rather, what is the agency conducting the proceeding
empowered to do, and how will it affect the positions of the persons before it.7s
It has been recognized that a proceeding before an administrative agency is a
civil, rather than a criminal proceeding, 79 and as such, it would seem that the general
principles of civil practice should apply. New York recognized this as early as 1901
when it interpreted the section of its constitution giving the right to defend in person
with counsel in civil cases to mean that it should apply in removal proceedings before an
administrative agency.80 Certain aspects of civil proceedings have been recognized by
the courts as applicable to proceedings before administrative agencies. Thus an agency
has no duty to furnish counsel, 8 and a failure to notify a party of his right to counsel
will not invalidate the proceedings.8 2 Also, neither counsel nor the interested party need
the investigatory stage can be successfully suppressed at a later stage, either at the hearing or upon
review by the courts. But by such procedure a person's rights are unnecessarily violated and there is
undue expense and delay.
75 Ibid.
76 352 U.S. 330 at 349, n. 28.
77 For example, see 17 N.J. REv. STAT § 52:17B-43.1 (1952) which created a Law Enforcement
Council and provided in § 52:17B-43.1 (1952) that any witness at any public or private hearing would
have the right to counsel, but only to advise him of his constitutional rights.
78 In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
79 Molina v. Munro, 145 Cal. App. 2d 601, 302 P.2d 818 (1956).
80 Smith v. Phisterer, 66 App. Div. 52, 73 N.Y. Supp. 124 (1901).
81 Bancroft v. Board of Registered Dentists, 202 Okla. 108, 210 P.2d 666 (1949).
82 Miner v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 88, 202 P.2d 557 (1949).
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be present at all times during the proceedings. 83 In the event a party does not appear
with counsel, the agency is under no duty to act as his counsel or protect his interests.8 4
The nature of civil proceedings demand, under the requirements of due process, that
the defendant ". . be served with notice of the proceedings and have a day in court
to make his defence."8 5 One court has said:
[P]rocedural due process, broadly speaking, contemplates the rudirnentry require-
merits of fair play, whether in a court or an administrative authority, which includes
a fair and open hearing . . .with notice and an opportunity to present evidence
and argument; representation by counsel, if desired; and information as to the
claims of the opposing party, with reasonable opportunity to controvert them.86
The right to be heard, even under the common law, has been held to include the right
to be represented by counsel.87 While due process does not necessarily require a
hearing of the judicial type,88 due process ought to require that a party" be fully
protected at each stage of the proceedings, rather than have to await subsequent
review by the courts. And fully protected should mean represented by counsel.
As in civil proceedings in the courts, certain conditions can be imposed on the
litigants, so also, certain conditions may be imposed on the conduct of administrative
proceedings. But when the conditions are arbitrary and unreasonable they violate due
process,8 9 and as such they should be inoperative. It is suggested that exclusion of
counsel in most instances is such an arbitrary condition. It has been stated that where
there exists (1) an emergency, 90 (2) some preliminary or investigatory power,91 (3)
the exercise of a summary power, 92 or (4) the possibility of a later review by the
courts, 93 neither hearing nor counsel is required by due process. But it is submitted, for
the reasons already suggested, that contentions (2) and (4) are not valid, and that in
the early stages of the emergency situation such procedure without counsel is justified on-
ly if later a hearing is afforded the affected party.94 In many instances, the exercise of the
summary powers does not require a hearing or representation by counsel, as there is
usually no particular issue in dispute nor any facts that need be determined by a judicial-
type process. These would include the operation of the social agencies whose purpose is
to administer to a large number of persorQs as expeditiously as possible. Agencies
handling unemployment compensation,9 5 veterans claims, 90 or similar agencies, are not
83 Molina v. Munro, supra note 79; Concrete Materials Corp. v. FrC, 189 F.2d 359 (7th Cir.
1951); NLRB v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 98 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1938); Manufacture
Light & Heat Co. v. Ott, 215 Fed. 940 (N.D. W.Va. 1914); People ex Tel. O'Neill v. Bingham, 132
App. Div 667, 117 N.Y. Supp. 429 (1909).
84 Griswald v. Department of A.B.C., 141 Cal. App. 2d 807, 297 P.2d 762 (1956). A party appear-
ing in person can gain no special privileges and is required to object to alleged hearsay and other
evidence in the same manner as would counsel.
85 Rees v. City of Walkerton, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107, 122 (1874).
86 Almon v. Morgan County, 245 Ala. 241, 16 So. 2d 511, 515 (1944).
87 Arnold v. Milwaukee, supra note 15. Right to counsel includes the right to private consultations
between attorney and client. Fusco v. Moses, 304 N.Y. 424, 107 N.E.2d 581 (1952).
88 L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 170 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
89 Cf. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co. 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931).
90 58 COLUM. L. Rav. 395 (1958).
91. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
92 FoRltoscH, ADMNisTRATEr LAw, ch. 7 (1957). Summary powers are establishment of temporary
rate orders, suspension orders, exercise of the police powers (seizure of articles, ultra vires acts), and
policy modification.
93 United States v. Levine, 127 F. Supp. 651 (D. Mass. 1955).
94 The fact the agency is to act quickly to protect the public interest does not mean a hearing
should not be afforded later. Cf. Halsey, Stuart & Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 212 Wis. 184, 248
N.W. 458 (1933), and compare State ex rel. Nowotny v. Milwaukee, supra note 29.
95 See MD. ConE ANN. art. 95A § 7 (1957). This statute provides first for an investigation of the
claim to determine questions of fact and later for a "fair hearing" before a Board of Appeals, and
finally appeal to the courts.
906 Most claims are usually settled by correspondence or conferences and extensive use of records.
Where there is a controversy, issues are not decided by pleadings, but again by correspondence and
conferences. Hearings may be held with party represented by counsel, but as most claims are settled
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required to hold extensive hearings unless the agency refuses to grant a request, and a
legal interpretation or a determination of a disputed fact has to be made.97 Also, where
the question to be decided by an agency is wholly legislative, such as the establishment
of a tax, presence of counsel would not be necessary, as the persons appearing before
it are there as "advisers" and not parties to the action. An appearance before a draft
board without counsel would not be prejudical to a person, for the person, though a
party to the proceedings, is afforded ample protection by being allowed to appeal to the
courts. Aside from these considerations, an agency of this type, composed of laymen
who are likewise without the aid of counsel is not suited to cope with purely legal ques-
tions, which should find disposition in a court of law.
Another factor that the courts should consider is the position of the person involved.
A private individual, less familiar with agency proceedings (or any legal proceeding),
should be granted more protection than a corporation whose officers and agents have
continual contact with various governmental figencies on both the state and federal
level. The courts have recognized a distinction of this type in other areas of the law98
and should carry it over into the area of the right to counsel.
IV. CONCLUSION
The assistance of counsel should be retained as one of the most important factors
in any legal proceeding, whether before a court of law or an administrative agency.
As there is usually no valid reason why counsel should be denied, it is the duty
of the courts to protect individuals by allowing them the assistance of counsel upon
request. From the largest federal agency to the smallest local body, no proceeding can
be sustained unless it is fair and just. Fairness would seem to imply a right to counsel.
Generally the Federal Government has recognized this and has attempted to correct
the situation by statute, but as previously seen it has not provided a fully adequate
remedy. In many of the states, however, both statutory and judicial remedy is lacking. If
the courts will carefully consider what the agency is empowered to do, who the persons
are before it, and that the proceedings are of a civil nature, they can only conclude that
the instances are rare indeed when a party to an administrative hearing may be denied
counsel. Investigation-hearing, judication-adjudication are mere labels that do not reach
substantive issues. The presence of counsel is one of the essential elements of the ad-
ministration of justice in our Anglo-American system. To give men rights, but to deny
to them the instrumentalities to exercise those rights, is, in effect, to give them nothing.
Richard L. Cousineau
upon medical examination or hospitalization, hearings are usually not necessary. Survey and Study of
Administrative Organization, Procedure and Practice, Part II D, H.R. 85th Cong. 1st Sess. 2070-73
(1957) (Comm. print).
97 This would mean that when a claim was first submitted and during preliminary determinations
and procedure, no counsel would be necessary. But as soon as any findings of fact are to be made that
will be final or substantially affect any later proceeding, one should be entitled to counsel at such point.
98 The courts give a private individual's records and papers more protection than a corporation's.
If this principle had been adopted by the court in either In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), or Bowles
v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944), a different, and seemingly more just, decision might have
resulted.
